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TWO NEW CONTRACT TYPES FOR OPERATION
OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED FACILITIES
BY
GEORGE T. NICKOLAS
Chief, Small Caliber Ammunition Branch
Ammunition Division
Procurement Directorate
Headquarters, US Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command
Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6000

ABSTRACT
With the ongoing emphasis or thrust, if you will, within the Government being placed on
contracting out, under 0MB Circular A-7b, the types of contractual instruments employed
become more of a focus for our attention than ever before. Consequently, the contracting
structure used by the Government in the management of Government-owned, Contractor-operated
facilities (GOCO) needs to be re-examined in this light. Objectives to be considered are
lowering costs, increasing flexibility, and maintaining ease of transition between the
various phases of the contracting process. New contract types must be designed and utilized
to meet changing conditions and requirements. Federal Acquisition Regulations need to be
revised to accommodate new contracting techniques. The use of the Cost Plus Award Fee con
tracts with subjective evaluation at GOCO-type facilities needs to be reviewed. The use of
Fixed Price contracts will be discussed, and the pros and cons of their use in this en
vironment will be discussed by the author in depth. Two new contract types which the author
has devised will then be presented. Future contract types will evolve as needs arise.
The first contract type proposed is the Cost Plus Award Fee (Objective) contract. This
contract provides for development of objective criteria that are definitive and not subjec
tive in nature.
The second type of contract is the Fixed Price Award Incentive contract which lends it
self well for application as a management contract in GOCO operations. This contract type
provides wider latitude in the management of the operations of a COCO or maintenance-type
operation when the volume and type of work cannot be definitively specified during the ini
tial phases of the process. This type of contract precludes the Government from active in
volvement in many adjustments to the cost/profit/fee base during a contract performance
period.
This paper will describe in complete detail the workings of these contract types, the
individual merits of each, and the problems which have been encountered in utilizing
traditional contract types in the management of Government-owned, Contractor-operated
facilities.
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official policy or the position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or
any Federal agency.
BACKGROUND
It is the policy of the Government to make periodic reviews of its operations to deter
mine if the Government should continue to operate a commercial-type activity or if the
Government's needs would be better served by contracting out that operation. The policy
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covering this process is promulgated by the Office of Management and
Budget in 0MB Circular
A-76. When it has been determined by the Government that a facility
will undergo a "cost
comparison," a group of designated employees of that activity will
develop a scope of work
(Statement of Work) that identifies what each of the parties must
do to operate, maintain,
and in some cases, determine what product must be produced. The Government
then issues a
solicitation to industry, and at the same time, the Government employees
develop an "in-house
proposal" to perform the work complying with the scope of work set
forth in the solicitation.
Contractors exhibiting an interest in competing for the operation
of the commercial ac
tivity assemble their proposals for the work and submit those proposals
to the Government in
the form of a sealed bid or proposal. The results of the submissions
by private industry are
reviewed and compared, and the apparent low evaluated price is determined.
At a
prespecifled, exact date and time, the Government's proposal is formally
opened, and a com
parison is made with the apparent low proposal submitted by the prospective
contractor. In
the event the Government is determined to be the most cost effective
operator, no contract
award is made, and the Government assumes or continues operation of
the facility as a
Government-owned, Government-operated (GOGO) facility. In nearly
all cases, the Government
operation is scaled down and streamlined by the scope of work. If,
after all factors are
considered, the contractor's price is considered the lowest, most
economical price, a con
tract is awarded, and the operation then becomes a Government-owned,
Contractor-operated
(GOCO) facility.
The preferential type of contract resulting from these commercial
activity reviews is
usually a Fixed Price contract. To be most equitable to all the
parties, a Fixed Price con
tract is almost mandatory. However, the scopes of work that are developed
in consideration
of the nature of the work at these facilities occasionally do not
support a Fixed Price con
tract. Because there is often some uncertainty in the amount and
type
performed during the course of the performance of the contract, there of work that will be
are often a con
siderable number of changes required to the scope of work. The variety
and the nature of
these changes make Fixed Price contracts difficult, if not impossible,
to administer. These
deviations from the scope are what necessitate the renegotiation
of the scope and cause a
dollar impact to the contractor. During this renegotiation phase,
the contract becomes a
Cost Plus type of contractual arrangement until the negotiations
are complete and an
equitable adjustment consummated.
SAMPLE PROBLEM
For example, the Government may have a need to negotiate a contract
to operate a Govern
ment facility. A proposed contractor is provided the scope of work
which identifies the work
or services to be performed. In this hypothetical case, trucks,
trailers, and wheel barrows
are to ,be manufactured. The Government has provided the contractor
the facilities, and it is
the contractor's responsibility to hire and compensate the workers.
The contractor is con
tractually obligated to purchase only the raw materials that are
required to manufacture the
specific components that the facility is designed to make or otherwise
specified by the con
tractual agreement. In our example, the rubber tires, motors, transmissions,
drive shafts,
axles, and the electrical wiring items are all supplied as Government-fur
nished property
(GFP) to be incorporated into the trucks, trailers, and wheel barrows.
Suppose that one of
the contractors who is manufacturing some of the items which are
being furnished as GFP is
late in delivery of his product. This delay has an impact upon the
delivery and production
schedule of the GOCO Operator. The GOCO operator delivery must slip,
and he has to
reschedule his work, causing cost impact to the contract. Depending
upon which stage in the
production effort the GOCO operator has reached, the exact magnitude
of the cost change would
have to be determined. Let us examine the provisions of the contract
clauses covering
changes as they currently exist in the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR).
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FIXED PRICE CLAUSE

The Fixed Price clause that is included in the Fixed Price contracts is the "Changes"
clause (FAR 52*243-1, Changes—Fixed Price, Apr 84). That clause provides that: "(b) If any
such changes cause an increase or decrease in the cost, or the time required for, performance
of any part of the work under this contract, whether or not changed by the order, the Con
tracting Officer shall make an equitable adjustment in the contract price, the delivery
schedule, or both* and, shall modify the contract." What happens when the change is made to
the delivery schedule? It affects when the contractor performs the work and impacts the
various manufacturing overhead costs, general and administrative costs, and even the direct
labor rates of the employees* This change has impact upon the price of the effort as
originally planned and proposed by the contractor to perform the work under the contract. It
may require that the contractor work overtime or a second shift to offset the delay caused by
the nonreceipt of the Government-furnished property. It affects the learning curve of the
employees on the production line, thereby increasing the costs that the contractor proposed.
In the Fixed Price contract situation, the contractor has a right to be made whole again.
The problem is that the contractor usually makes up for "Buy-in" by the changes made after
contract production begins and is made more than whole.
INCENTIVE CONTRACT CLAUSE

Some contracts are awarded on an ""Incentive Fee" basis. The clause that is applicable
to the "Incentive Fee"" contracts is FAR 52.216-10, Incentive Fee (Apr 84). This clause
stipulates: *"(d) Equitable adjustments. When the work under this contract is increased or
decreased by a modification to this contract or when any equitable adjustment in the target
cost, target fee, minimum fee and maximum fee,, as appropriate, shall be stated- in a sup
plemental agreement to this contract.'1'"
It would appear from this contract provision that we are talking about revisions to the
various targets when, there is an increase or decrease in the amount of work to be performed
on the contract. However, we cannot overlook changes that would delay performance periods or
changes that affect the contractor's profitability. If there is a late receipt of GFP, the
contractor who is operating under an, incentive-type contract where the target cost is af
fected must be treated fairly, The targets must be adjusted to reflect the cost impact of
the delay. The. stage of the contractor's performance has a substantial impact on the adjustment required to the targets.
COST REIMBURSEMENT CLAUSE

FAR 52*243.2, Changes - Cost Reimbursement (Apr 84) clause provides that: "(b) If any
such change causes an increase or decrease in the estimated cost of, or the time required
for, performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether or not changed by the
order, or otherwise affects any other terms and conditions of this contract, the contracting
officer shall make an. equitable adjustment in the (l) estimated cost, delivery or completion
schedule or both, (2) amount of any fixed fee, and (3) other affected terms and conditions
shall modify the contract accordingly . . * ."
The sane examples as stated before would require that this contract be adjusted. Adjustments require an. expense for Government evaluation of the changes, contractor' preparation
of a proposal, and the evaluation of the contractor's proposal. They also require negotia
tion and..the reaching of a settlement. These are very costly procedures which can be avoided
as will be discussed later.
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WHAT IS NEEDED?

The question of what kind of contract is ideal for the operation of a GOCO is a dif
ficult one to answer in a few words. A contract that has the flexibility to meet the demands
of constant changes and yet provide an incentive for the contractor to perform well is that
ideal contract type. Some contractors, like those Department of Energy contractors who
operate laboratories, often are not paid a profit or a fee. Their corporate benefit is from
the research that can support advances in their consumer product lines or advance the "state
of the art" which will indirectly aid their corporate product lines or add new products to
their commercial business. Most contractors, however, want to make a profit to add to the
corporate income statement. Thus, the current contract types with the FAR clauses that exist
do not provide this needed flexibility because they require constant adjustment to both tar
get cost and fee or, in the case of fixed price contract, to the total price of the contract.
What is needed is a contract that is flexible, allows for work changes and delivery
revisions, increase in quantities to be produced or changes to the scope of work within
predetermined guidelines without a corresponding change in the profit or fee structure that
is applied. The current contract types that are used in the GOCO Operations do not
facilitate the latitude of flexibility that is desired and, in most cases, needed by the
Government.
The question that immediately comes to most peoples 1 minds is "What about the need to
increase the rate of production of a product that might be the mission of the
Government-owned, Contractor-operated facility?" For instance, the Government requires the
contractor to produce 2,000 pounds of TNT a month instead of 1,500 pounds that were
originally forecasted at the beginning of the year. The process requires that the batch
sizes be increased and, in most cases, the only additional effort that is required is the
increase in the quantities of raw materials that are purchased and possibly some additional
packaging and shipping effort. Additional people and management would be minimal, if at all.
Under the operation of the current contract clauses that would apply, the Government and the
contractor would have to negotiate a change to the contract. This would require a proposal,
evaluation, audit, and the effort to negotiate a supplemental agreement to the contract for
the additional costs. What is needed is a contract which by its operation and the agreement
of the parties, in the beginning of the contract, provides for changes which, for example,
will not require the addition of more than 25 to 50 people to the work force without ad
justment of the fee/profit of the contract. The only change would be an increase in the
Government's limitation of cost to cover the new or additional work. The cost base increase
would be established based upon historical data that is available to the Government in most
situations or from a budget estimate that the contractor would provide upon request by the
Government.
COST PLUS AWARD FEE CONTRACTS
Under the current provision of the FAR, we can negotiate Cost Plus Award Fee contracts to
provide a contractor an incentive to perform against established incentive criteria. The in
tended results are improved performance in areas where the Government believes that improve
ment is needed or in areas where emphasis by the contractor is needed to preclude problems
(e.g. safety, security, and quality). The evaluation process for these contracts permits the
contractor to provide the Government with an evaluation of the contractor's performance* This
evaluation is, in many cases, a detailed synopsis of the contractor f s perceived great
performance and comprises hundreds of pages of good stories and examples* The Contracting
Officer's Representative, a person who heads a staff of Government employees who review the
day-to-day operations and performance of the contractor at the work site, also prepares a
detailed evaluation of the contractor's work against the established criteria. This is a sub
jective evaluation open to judgment calls by this staff*

These two evaluations are normally reviewed by a Cost Plus Award Fee Board which meets
and reviews -the evaluation and then arrives at some percentage to apply to the performance*
This is translated into dollars from the fee pool by the Fee Determination Authority. In 99
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out of 100 cases., the Board's determination becomes the percentage of the fee pool that is
awarded the contractor. The author has sat upon many of these boards and has discovered that
an overall rating of between 85 to 95 percent of the total fee pool is awarded to the con
tractor for the evaluation period. Further, there is a tendency, over time, for the evalua
tions to creep higher* Thus, in the first year if the contractor is awarded 86 percent of
the fee pool, the next year it will be 88 or 89 percent and eventually will creep into the
90-percent range*
Notwithstanding this creep, there is- a reluctance on the part of many contractors to ac
cept the subjective nature of the Cost Plus Award Fee contracts in use today. The reason for
this reluctance is the fact that the evaluation is subjective and not open for challenge.
The contractors fear that contracting officers or other people in the Government will un
justly evaluate them low and thereby deprive them of a just reward for their performance.
The author cannot validate that there is a basis for this concern in factual situations based
upon his years of board reviews in actual situations. Nonetheless, this concern has been ex
pressed by many companies. 'What the contractors want are definitive goals or objectives and
the right to appeal the fee assessment based on questions of fact.
The author, after considerable evaluation of the efforts of contractors and the desires
of the Government, has reached the conclusion that an "objective" award fee contract could be
developed. Since the Government is dealing with services and general contractor performance
as opposed to the performance of the end products, the Cost Plus Incentive Fee contracts with
multiple incentives is not practical.
What are the usual desires of the Government for the contractor to operate any Govern
ment facility? The contractor should manage costs, produce a quality product, or perform the
service outlined, perform the work safely, and maintain the Government equipment without
causing excessive wear of that equipment.
Objective criteria are called for, such as the contractor's being required to produce
acceptable lots of product 98 percent of the time, thereby providing a reduction in the fee
pool in the event that the contractor had rejection rates of 97 percent or more. The same
type of consideration could be applied to equipment maintenance or safety. The key in any of
these contracts is that the areas to be incentivized must not be excessive and the criteria
clearly written. Only in areas where poor performance has been a problem should incentives
be considered. To have ten areas with three and four sub-elements only dilutes the incentive
pool to a point where there is no longer any incentive. The objective criteria and the ap
plicable ratings would not require the convening of an Award Fee Board. The statistics that
are generated during the performance of the contract would be applied against the standards,
and a numerical rating calculated. The contracting office would only have to compute the
figures and modify the contract for contractor payment based on these results. This feature
would save the Government substantial dollars in the cost of preparing the evaluation data
for subjective evaluations. If we equate a page of data to be worth $25.00, multiplied by
hundreds of pages developed by both parties, the savings resulting during the evaluation
period could conceivably amount to thousands if not tens of thousands of dollars. In a
Cost-type contract, the contractor's costs are passed on to the Government as an allowable
element of cost. This can also be true in Fixed Price contracts in GOCO operations.
FIXED PRICE AWARD INCENTIVE

In a recent copy of the "National Contract Management Magazine," there was an article on
Fixed Price Award Incentive contracts. The concept that the author of the article set forth
provided that the Government and contractor would agree to a fixed-price contract. Within
the framework of that contract, there would be established a pool of money that would be at
risk based upon the contractor's quality of performance, such as is normally the case in the
Cost Plus Award Fee contracts. The normal cost plus award fee arrangement allows change to
the fee pool as work increases or decreases, as changes to rate and time of delivery occur,
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etc. A better method is needed to manage the Department of Energy and Department of Defense
GOCO contracts.
The author proposes a Fixed Price Award Incentive contract to run concurrently with a
cost-reimbursement production effort. The Fixed Price Award Incentive contract would not be
adjusted when the effort under the cost reimbursement production effort increases. The Fixed
Price Award Incentive would be the dollars that the contractor wanted to manage the facility
or operation for the period of production covered by the contract. The scope would be
general in nature and reflect the mission of the facility and, within that mission, the con
tractor would manage the operation. The Fixed Price Award Incentive would be the fee/profit
that is normally applied to any contract. The difference would be that there would be no ad
justments to this contract unless a pre-established trigger was reached. The trigger would
be to change the mission of the facility to add new work. This new work would be similar to
the "new start" work considered under 0MB Circular A-76. At that time, the increased effort
would be evaluated, and the contractor's Fixed Price Award Incentive contract would be amen
ded. A good example of this would be the facility that the contractor operated which
produced tanks being converted to produce cannon or other items which were not generic to the
operations of that facility. The new effort would then require additional skills or tech
nology not currently available at the facility and thus require more intensive managerial ef
forts or risks. The mere increase of effort or addition of quantity would not increase the
Fixed Price Award Incentive contract. The Fixed Price Award Incentive contract would not be
tied directly to the dollar effort of the Cost Reimbursement production/maintenance effort of
the facility. Excluding the Fixed Price Award Incentive contract's relationship to cost
would preclude the escalation of costs by the contractor to achieve a higher profit. This
escalation occurs in many contracts from year to year.
One of the key elements of the Fixed Price Award Incentive is that objective criteria
would be established not unlike those of the Cost Plus Award Fee contract indicated above,
but in this contract type operation, there would be no negotiation of the cost base or
cost-type contract. The Government, based upon historical operation data, would determine
the limitation of cost ceiling that would be established for the contractor's performance of
the cost-reimbursement contract. If the Government did not have exact data available and
could not develop an estimated cost, a budget estimate would be obtained from the operating
contractor for this differing work. The Government would perform a limited evaluation of
that proposal and would establish the limitation of liability based upon the evaluated
amount. The detail and extent of the evaluation would be based upon the nature of the
proposal. By not going through a detailed cost proposal evaluation and negotiations, sub
stantial dollars would be saved on the part of the Government and the contractor. The cost
of both efforts could reduce the cost that the Government (public) must experience. Since
the Fixed Price Award Fee contract would not have its base in the dollars of the
cost-reimbursement effort, the exact amount is not as important. The determination of the
reasonable cost for the purpose of establishing a reasonable fee is not a problem for the
Fixed Price Award Incentive contract. What we are looking at is the quality of the manage
ment effort for which the Government is obligating itself. The Fixed Price Award Incentive
contract will place most of the dollars at risk. There could be an agreement made that 90
percent of the contract amount would be at risk under the incentive arrangement that is
negotiated by the parties. These areas would be objective in nature. Cost management must
be a large and key element. This element serves to preclude the contractor from failing to
halt runaway costs in production, maintenance, etc. The other elements such as safety,
security, production quality, timely delivery, timely service, quality of service, etc., can
be evaluated against objective criteria. Statistical guidelines can be developed, and a
ranking against these criteria can be made by the contracting officer in order that the con
tractor be paid. In the event there is a disagreement, the contractor could dispute the
question of fact that was causing the difference of opinion, and some judicial remedy could
apply.
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RECOMMENDATION

One of the military services, in cooperation with the Department of Energy, should take
hold of this concept and develop the necessary implementation provisions to test the concept
at one or more of the Government-owned, Contractor-operated facilities. Such a test could be
accomplished over a 3-year period, of time. At the end of that period or at some point in the
interim, the Federal Acquisition, Regulations (FAR) could be amended to include the use of
these contract types when the circumstances dictate. The use of the Cost Plus Award Fee (ob
jective:) contract should be the easier of the two to implement since the departure from the
norm is only miniscule, in that the criteria become objective, as opposed to the current sub
jective nature of the criteria presently being used. The cost base of the contract is still
negotiated and yet does not drastically change the manner in which business is conducted.
The Fixed Price Award Incentive contract and the Cost-Reimbursement combined contract should
be reviewed in more detail to confirm the conclusions of the author. This contract type
could' save many., dollars in pre-contractual costs on the part of both the Government and the
contractor* One estimate is that there might be as much as $500,000 savings per contract on
the large t hundred—million~dollar contracts. These figures mandate that serious considera
tion!, be given the Matter* It is recommended that efforts be undertaken to test the Fixed
Price Award ..Incentive contracting method and that- a FAR deviation be granted for a period of
3 years in order to undergo testing by the military and the Department of Energy in current,
active production operations*
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